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[There are very few freedom of information cases that have been 
heard by the High Court of Australia and this article discusses 
freedom of information rights in the context of the Court’s recent 
important decision in McKinnon. After reviewing the judgments in 
the case, the author advocates that freedom of information rights 
must not be seen in isolation, but in the context of broader 
constitutional rights, including the implied right to political freedom 
of communication, as well as the doctrine of representative 
government. It is suggested that the effect of the decision is to unduly 
narrow the rights citizens would otherwise have under freedom of 
information laws, and is contrary to the spirit of such laws. It 
compromises the ability of the sovereign people to exercise that 
sovereignty over their elected representatives. Placing freedom of 
information rights into this broader constitutional perspective, the 
decision can be seen as out of step with the Constitution and its 
prescribed system of government. More broadly, it is considered that 
freedom of information principles must be interpreted within the 
existing constitutional rights framework.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
It will first be necessary to explain the context in which the decision made, 
and go into some detail on the various judgments. The decision in McKinnon 
v Secretary, Department of Treasury
1
 considered the scope of the 
Commonwealth freedom of information laws, in the particular context where 
a Minister had issued a certificate to the effect that disclosure of the requested 
information would be contrary to the public interest. A newspaper had 
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requested information regarding tax bracket creep and the Government’s first 
home owners’ scheme. Of course, the object of freedom of information 
legislation is to provide greater openness and accountability in government 
decision making. Section 3(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Cth)(FOI Act) states the Act seeks to extend as far as possible the right of 
the Australian community to information in the possession of the 
Commonwealth government, limited only by exceptions and exemptions 
necessary for the protection of essential public interests and the private and 
business affairs of those in respect of whom information is collected. 
Applying general principles of statutory interpretation, the Act specifically 
states that the Act should be interpreted to further the object of the Act 
(s3(2)). 
 
The relevant exemption in this case is contained in s36 of the FOI Act, 
providing for the non-disclosure of a document that satisfied two conditions: 
(a) it contained matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or 
recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded or deliberation that 
has taken place, in the course of deliberative process involving an 
agency or Minister; and 
(b) disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. 
(Similar provisions appear in freedom of information laws at the State level).
2
 
 
Section 36(3) of the Act allowed a Minister to sign a certificate which, while 
current, would establish conclusively that the second condition for exemption 
was fulfilled. Such an action was amenable to review, but of a more limited 
nature than that provided for elsewhere in the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)(AAT Act). The function of the review tribunal in 
such a case was not to consider the merits of the decision that disclosure was 
not in the public interest; it was confined to the more limited consideration of 
whether there existed reasonable grounds for the claim that disclosure would 
be contrary to the public interest (s58(5) of the FOI Act). The Act required 
the Minister in such a case to specify the ground of public interest upon 
which he or she relied. 
 
 
 A Request in this Case 
 
In this case, an employee of The Australian sought access to two kinds of 
document – those relating to tax ‘bracket creep’, and those relating to the first 
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home owners’ scheme. The Commonwealth Treasury identified almost one 
hundred documents relevant to the request, but claimed that most of the 
documents were exempt. After the applicant commenced legal proceedings to 
challenge this decision, the Treasurer signed two certificates under s36(3) of 
the Act to the effect that disclosure of most of the documents identified by 
the Department in its search would be contrary to the public interest. 
Specifically, it was claimed that: 
 
(a) government officers should be able to communicate directly, freely 
and confidentially with the Minister on sensitive matters; 
(b) officers should be able to freely reduce to writing what they would 
otherwise do orally; if they were to be released for public scrutiny, 
officers may in future be reluctant to make a written record, to the 
detriment of the process and the public record; 
(c) release of a document discussing options that were not settled at the 
time of drafting and outlining options not ultimately taken could be 
likely to mislead and confuse the public and undermine the 
government’s public integrity 
(d) release may be confusing or misleading given its provisional nature 
(e) release of documents with different versions of estimates, 
projections, costings and other numerical analysis may confuse the 
public and would not make a valuable contribution to public debate 
and could again undermine the government’s public integrity 
(f) the preparation of possible responses to questions in Parliament was 
a very sensitive aspect of the department’s work and should remain 
confidential; 
(g) the release of documents intended for a specific audience familiar 
with technical terms and jargon used could lead to public 
misunderstanding; they do not contain sufficient information for an 
uninformed audience to interpret them correctly or reasonably.  
 
Broadly, these concerns revolved around confidentiality and the misleading 
nature of the disclosed information. 
 
The applicant appealed to the Tribunal for a review of the decision that 
release of the documents would be contrary to the public interest. Due to the 
precise wording of s58(5) of the Act, this could only be on the basis that there 
were no reasonable grounds for the making of the Minister’s decision in this 
regard. To re-iterate, this was not a typical merits review typically undertaken 
by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. It was not to re-open the question 
whether in fact disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. The 
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Tribunal determined there were reasonable grounds for the claim that 
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.  
 
This was affirmed by the Full Federal Court by 2-1.
3
 The main point of 
contention here was the nature of the review process undertaken by the 
Tribunal in the case of a Ministerial conclusiveness certificate. Tamberlin and 
Jacobson JJ had a narrow view of such a process. According to the majority, 
the Tribunal should not undergo a weighing or balancing exercise in order to 
exercise its power of review under s58(5). It was enough to confirm the 
Minister’s certificate that grounds existed that were not irrational, absurd or 
ridiculous.
4
 This was important because here the Tribunal had not considered 
in any detail evidence from experts retained by the applicant in this case who 
believed that disclosure of these documents was in the public interest. The 
Tribunal did not think that the exercise of its power in s58(5) required them 
to consider such evidence. In dissent, Conti J thought that a balancing 
exercise was required. Referring to a High Court decision involving the 
requirement for reasonable evidence to support an application for a search 
warrant, he concluded 
 
Rationality, or the quality of being rational, the possession of reason, or the 
reaching of a rational or reasonable view, in accordance with the George v 
Rockett thesis, is not to be objectively attained or achieved, according to the 
submissions of the appellant which I would favour, by a decision maker 
exercising a statutory function of review in the absence of his or her 
balancing (or weighing) objectively differing and competing views not 
unreasonably open to be adopted
5
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to believe that liquor is sold’ etc. So to hold would be to hold that the justice may 
discharge the judicial duty cast upon him by acting, parrot-like, upon the bald 
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Given his view that the Tribunal had not weighed and balanced the evidence 
of the appellant’s witnesses, he would have remitted the matter back to the 
Tribunal on the basis of an error of law. 
 
The applicant then appealed to the High Court.
6
 
 
 
 B High Court Majority View 
 
By majority, the High Court dismissed the appeal from the decision of the 
Full Federal Court, upholding the original Tribunal decision that reasonable 
grounds existed for the belief, so in effect the material did not need to be 
disclosed. Callinan and Heydon JJ accepted most of the reasoning from the 
Department of Treasury as to why disclosure should not be allowed. 
Specifically, these judges accepted the argument by Treasury that the 
documents were interim in nature, involving some recommendations that 
were not adopted. They concluded that it would be difficult to see how it 
would not be reasonable for a Minister to take the view that the release of 
material of that kind would not make a valuable contribution to public 
debate.
7
 They upheld the reasonableness of Treasury’s view that disclosure 
might jeopardize candour and discourage written communication within 
government, on the basis that the ‘Minister’s opinion and experience are 
likely to be as well informed and valuable as those of anyone else’.
8
 Callinan 
and Heydon JJ accepted the reasonableness of the argument that documents 
prepared for possible responses to questions in Parliament should remain 
confidential ‘because their exposure would threaten the Westminster system 
of government, that is to say responsible government … that cannot be said 
to be an unreasonable view’.
9
 The joint judgment did not accept the argument 
from Treasury that disclosure should be prohibited because members of the 
public may not understand the technicalities or jargon used in the 
documents,
10
 on the basis that experts could assist in interpreting the 
information. 
 
The joint judgment agreed with the majority of the Full Federal Court that the 
process under s36(3) did not involve balancing a number of considerations. It 
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agreed with the view of the Full Federal Court that in effect if one reasonable 
ground for the claim of contrariety to the public interest exists then, although 
there may be reasonable grounds the other way, the conclusiveness would be 
beyond review.
11
 Curiously, the joint judges reached this conclusion, 
although acknowledging that the approach they applied may lead to the 
‘practical consequence … that one or more of the stated objects of the Act are 
thereby defeated’.
12
 They concluded that the test mentioned in s36(3) should 
not be para-phrased into another test.
13
 Callinan and Heydon JJ left open the 
question then whether ‘the only practical and real means of attacking a 
conclusive certificate will be by demonstrating that there are no reasonable 
grounds in fact, or that the grounds relied on are so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person could hold the opinions upon which they are based’.
14
 
They denied that the test of public interest was ‘multi-faceted’.
15
 As 
indicated, although agreeing with the majority view, Hayne J differed in 
some respects, including a rejection of the argument that the existence of at 
least one non-absurd ground justifying non-disclosure was sufficient to 
dispose of the case.
16
 Hayne J concluded that the Tribunal had exercised the 
review power responsibly, and had not fallen into the error of treating the 
‘class’ of documents to which those in question belonged as conclusive as to 
the question of their eligibility for release.
17
 
 
 
 C High Court Minority View 
 
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J quoted a passage from Tamberlin J of the Full 
Federal Court indicating that provided there was a ground that was not 
irrational, absurd or ridiculous for a claim that the public interest required 
non-disclosure, s58(5) of the Act would be satisfied. One example given by 
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 1576. This is in contrast with the position of Hayne J, that the mere fact that one 
reason was non-absurd was sufficient to find the existence of reasonable grounds 
(1563). 
12
 1576; they justified their conclusion on the basis it was required by the clear words 
of the relevant sections of the Act. 
13
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14
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15
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16
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that Court was that it was desirable that inter-governmental communications 
by kept confidential. The minority judges did not accept this approach. If it 
were accepted, they claimed, then every decision by the Minister to issue the 
non-disclosure certificate could be justified on the basis of confidentiality of 
government communication. The applicant would never be able to succeed 
with their application, because every non-disclosure of a government 
document could be justified on this basis.
18
 In stark contrast to the majority, 
the minority stated that the public interest was a multi-faceted concept.
19
 As a 
result, the circumstance that there is something relevant to be put against 
disclosure was not the end of the matter; it was the beginning. The Tribunal 
was required to take into account all relevant considerations.  
 
In contrast to the dissenting judge Conti J in the Full Federal Court, however, 
the minority in the High Court denied it was a balancing exercise, stating that 
the FOI Act was instead premised on disclosure of information as the general 
principle, subject to exceptions and exemptions in some cases.
20
 The minority 
would have set aside the decision of the Full Federal Court and Tribunal, and 
ask that the Tribunal again consider the matter. 
 
It is submitted there are two main bases on which to critique the judgment of 
the majority in this case. It is said that the decision is inconsistent with the 
Constitution in that: 
 
(a) it did not take into account the constitutionally implied freedom of 
communication about political matters and the requirements of 
representative government in interpreting the Act; and 
(b) the techniques used to assess the reasons for non-disclosure, as well 
as the reasons themselves accepted by the Court, are open to 
question, given their consequences for a strong separation of powers, 
which is mandated by the Constitution. 
 
These broad principles will now be further explored in the context of FOI 
rights. 
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II FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION ABOUT POLITICAL MATTERS     
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
One of the grounds on which the decision can be questioned is that it did not 
consider the applicability to the case of some implied freedoms that the High 
Court has previously found to exist in the Constitution. It is submitted that 
these freedoms are directly relevant to a consideration of the meaning of FOI 
law. There are clear links between freedom of communication about political 
affairs, and the objects of FOI law.
21
 
 
In a series of cases, the High Court has confirmed that Australians enjoy an 
implied constitutional right to freedom of communication in political 
matters.
22
 The basis of the implied right is the idea that the Australian 
Constitution contemplates a system of representative government, which can 
only work effectively if citizens have a right to communicate about political 
issues. Mason CJ in the Australian Capital Television case made the 
connection between freedom of information and the constitutional right in 
these terms: 
 
Communication in the exercise of the freedom is by no means a one-way 
traffic, for the elected representatives have a responsibility not only to 
ascertain the views of the electorate but also to explain and account for their 
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 For example Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 
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Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. These cases are the 
subject of an extensive literature – refer for example to Glenn Patmore ‘Making 
Sense of Representative Democracy and the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication in the High Court of Australia’ (1998) 7 Griffith Law Review 97; 
Michael Coper ‘The High Court and Free Speech: Visions of Democracy or 
Delusions of Grandeur?’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 185; Nicholas Aroney ‘A 
Seductive Plausibility: Freedom of Speech in the Constitution’ (1995) 18(2) 
University of Queensland Law Journal 249; Jeffrey Goldsworthy ‘Constitutional 
Implications and Freedom of Political Speech: A Reply to Stephen Donaghue’ (1997) 
23 Monash University Law Review 362; P Creighton ‘The Implied Guarantee of Free 
Political Communication’ (1993) 23 University of Western Australia Law Review 
163; H P Lee ‘The Australian High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees’ 
(1993) Public L 606; and Adrienne Stone ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: the 
Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication under the Australian 
Constitution’ (1998) 21 University of New South Wales Law Journal 117 
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decisions and actions in government and to inform the people so that they 
may make informed judgments on relevant matters. Absent such a freedom of 
communication, representative government would fail to achieve its purpose, 
namely government by the people through their elected representatives; 
government would cease to be responsive to the needs and wishes of the 
people and, in that sense, would cease to be truly representative … individual 
judgment … on so many issues turns upon free public discussion in the 
media of the views of all interested persons, groups and bodies and on public 
participation in, and access to, that discussion.
23
 
 
Mason CJ concluded that the court should be astute not to accept at face 
value claims by the legislature and executive that freedom of communication 
will, unless curtailed, bring about corruption and distortion of the political 
process.
24
 McHugh J in the same case agreed that voters had a constitutional 
right to convey and receive opinions, arguments and information concerning 
matter likely or intended to affect voting in an election.
25
 This was said to be 
because in order that representative and responsible government could 
operate effectively and as the Constitution intended. Brennan J in the same 
case agreed that freedom of political discussion was essential to the 
democratic process.
26
  
 
As Mason CJ said in ACT v Cth: 
 
Members of Parliament and Ministers are accountable to the people 
for what they do and have a responsibility to take into account of the 
views of the people on whose behalf they act … Indispensable to that 
accountability and that responsibility is freedom of communication, 
                                                 
23
 (1992) 177 CLR 106,139 
24
 P139 
25
 P232; ‘if the institutions of representative and responsible government are to 
operate effectively and as the Constitution intended, the business of government must 
be examinable and the subject of scrutiny, debate and ultimate accountability at the 
ballot box. The electors must be able to ascertain and examine the performances of 
their elected representatives and the capabilities and policies of all candidates for 
election. Before they can cast an effective vote at election time, they must have 
access to the information, ideas and arguments which are necessary to make an 
informed judgment as to how they have been governed and as to what policies are in 
the interests of themselves, their communities and the nation … the ability of the 
people to make informed choices among candidates for political office is 
fundamental because the identity of those who are elected will shape the nation’s 
destiny (231) 
26
 P159 
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at least in relation to public affairs and political discussion … In a 
free democratic society, it is almost too obvious to need stating that 
those who hold office in government and who are responsible for 
public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt 
to stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the 
most insidious and objectionable kind.
27
 
 
In Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd, Deane J agreed that:  
 
The freedom of the citizen to examine, discuss and criticise the 
suitability for office of the elected members of the Parliament and the 
manner in which they discharge their functions and duties as such 
lies at the very heart of the freedom which the implication of freedom 
of communication protects.
28
 
 
The High Court unanimously accepted in Lange that the: 
 
Common convenience and welfare of Australian society are 
advanced by discussion – the giving and receiving of information – 
about government and political matters (emphasis added)
29
 
 
In Egan v Willis, a case involving ministerial obligations to answer questions 
in, and to table documents to, the New South Wales Legislative Council, 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted:  
 
It has been said of the contemporary position in Australia that, whilst 
the primary role of Parliament is to pass laws, it also has important 
functions to question and criticise government on behalf of the 
people and that ‘to secure accountability of governmental activity is 
the very essence of responsible government … In Australia s75(v) of 
the Constitution and judicial review of administrative action under 
federal and State law, together with freedom of information 
legislation, supplement the operation of responsible government in 
this respect.
30
 
 
                                                 
27
 (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (partly quoting Derbyshire County Council v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, 548 per Lord Keith) 
28
 (1994) 124 ALR 1, 58; refer also to ACT v Cth (1992) 177 CLR 106, per Mason CJ 
(140) and McHugh J (231) 
29
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571 
30
 (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451 
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Importantly, these rights have been found to limit both legislative and 
executive power.
31
 
 
Certainly, the High Court of Australia has been at pains to make clear that the 
right to political free speech is not a positive, personal right, but rather a 
‘freedom from governmental action’.
32
 The court was clear in Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation that the sections from which the 
implied right to political free speech were implied: 
 
Do not confer personal rights on individuals. Rather they preclude 
the curtailment of the protected freedom by the exercise of legislative 
or executive power … they are a limitation or confinement of laws 
and powers which give rise to a pro tanto immunity on the part of the 
citizen from being adversely affected by those laws or by the exercise 
of those powers
33
 
 
In the McKinnon litigation, the appellant led arguments based on the implied 
freedom of political communication. Conti J in the Full Federal Court 
specifically acknowledged them, citing ACT v Commonwealth and other 
cases, and concluded they were relevant to this case.
34
 
 
The argument then is that the Minister’s apparently unbridled power to issue 
a certificate that disclosure of information would be contrary to the public 
interest is limited by the right of individuals to political communication, 
which as the High Court has itself recognised, requires access to government-
                                                 
31
 Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 149; Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson Toohey Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ), Mulholland v 
Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 245 (Gummow and Hayne 
JJ). The case of Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (2003) 134 FCR 334 is one example where a regulation prohibiting a 
member of the Australian Public Service from giving or disclosing any information 
about public business or anything of which the employee has official knowledge was 
invalidated as being an unreasonable burden upon the constitutional freedom. Refer 
also to the right discussed in the context of a member of the police service, a member 
of the Executive, in Coleman v Power (2004) 209 ALR 182 
32
 Hayne J in McClure v Australian Electoral Commission (1999) 163 ALR 734, 
740-741 
33
 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560 (Brennan CJ, Dawson Toohey Gaudron McHugh 
Gummow and Kirby JJ) 
34
 110; ‘it can scarcely be said that those observations have no bearing at all upon the 
issues arising at the Tribunal hearing’. 
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held information.
35
 Just as the High Court said in Lange that statutory 
defamation law are construed, if possible, conformably with the Constitution, 
but that if they conflict with the constitutional right, must yield to it,
36
 so here 
we accept the Minister’s right to issue a certificate, but require it must be 
exercised in conformity with the constitutional freedom. It means that the 
Minister’s certificate issuing power cannot be exercised in relation to matters 
falling within the definition of ‘political issue’ unless it meets the second of 
the Lange conditions, to which we will shortly turn. Of course, to the extent 
that the minister’s power to issue certificates relates to an issue that is not 
considered to be ‘political’, it is a power unaffected by the freedom of 
political communication. 
 
The author submits that in most federal election campaigns, the taxation 
policy of each of the political parties is a key issue likely to affect voting in 
an election. The release of information about bracket creep regarding 
taxation, or the impact of a key government policy to assist first home 
buyers, would assist voters in their decision on the effectiveness of the 
government of the day, or the relative merits of the policies of other political 
parties. These are clearly political matters. If further evidence be needed, 
Conti J in the Full Federal Court noted that income tax bracket creep and the 
first home owner’s scheme had ‘apparently occupied at least the financial and 
political segments of the media for some time’.
37
 Consistently with the right 
to freedom of communication, it is submitted that citizens should be able to 
read government documents in relation to these important political issues. 
 
The High Court in Lange reinterpreted the political right to freedom of 
speech in terms of two tests: 
 
(a) whether the law effectively burdens freedom of communication 
about government or political matters in its terms, operation or effect; 
and 
(b) if so, is it reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate 
end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government
38
 
 
                                                 
35
 Or, somewhat pedantically, that legislation or executive action not inhibit this 
right. 
36
 566 
37
 80 
38
 567 (per Brennan CJ Dawson Toohey Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ) 
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The assertion is that the issue of the Ministerial conclusiveness certificate 
resulting in the non-disclosure of information about ‘political issues’ falls 
within the first test, accepting that ‘law’ here includes executive as well as 
legislative action. It is submitted the Court should have then asked whether 
such an exercise then was reasonably appropriate and adapted to a legitimate 
end that was consistent with representative and responsible government. Of 
course although mentioned in the Federal Court, this was apparently not 
argued before the High Court in the McKinnon case. However, the author 
submits that this is an issue which should have been considered, and the 
author finds it hard to reconcile the decision in McKinnon itself with the 
implicit (negative) right to political free communication that the High Court 
has recognised in a large number of cases. The author agrees with Mason CJ 
in ACT v Cth
39
 about the need for the court’s astuteness in not accepting at 
face value claims by the legislature and/or executive that freedom of 
communication would corrupt or distort the political process. These 
comments are considered particularly apt here in relation to the Minister’s 
grounds for refusing release of information in this case. 
 
The author’s view is that the High Court, having accepted that the first limb 
in Lange was satisfied, should have considered whether the Ministerial 
discretion in this case was consistent with our system of responsible and 
representative government (emphasis added). By an interesting coincidence, 
responsible government was raised by members of the High Court, though as 
a reason for withholding the information. Callinan and Heydon JJ accepted 
the Government assertion that documents prepared for possible responses by 
Ministers in Parliament should remain confidential because their exposure 
would ‘threaten the Westminster system of government, that is to say 
responsible government’
40
 (emphasis added). 
 
Of course, the Westminster system of government comprises many features; 
while responsible government is certainly one, equally representative 
government is another. Representative government is described by Mill as 
one where:  
 
Sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested 
in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only 
having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, 
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the 
                                                 
39
 145 
40
 1575 
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government by the personal discharge of some public function, local 
or general
41
  
 
The author submits that part of having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate 
sovereignty is to find out the basis on which decisions have been taken by the 
representatives of the people. The people cannot exercise the sovereignty 
they possess if they cannot hold their representatives accountable for the 
decisions they make, and they cannot form an informed judgment about their 
representatives if they are left in the dark about the research background 
against which their representatives have made decisions.
42
 It would surely be 
to turn representative government on its head to say that the representatives 
of the people could mandate the information to which the sovereign people 
should have access in informing their exercise of sovereign rights.
43
 McHugh 
J has made the explicit link between freedom of expression and 
representative government, concluding that ‘if the institutions of 
representative and responsible government are to operate effectively, and as 
the Constitution intended, the business of government must be examinable 
and the subject of scrutiny and debate’.
44
  
 
Others have made the link between FOI law and citizens’ participation in 
government. Owen J from the Supreme Court of Western Australia noted: 
 
The implied (right to freedom of expression) was a manifestation of 
the concept of representative democracy and the rationale upon 
which it rested was a relevant consideration that the Commissioner 
was obliged to take into account in determining the public interest (in 
disclosure).
45
  
                                                 
41
 John Stuart Mill Considerations on Representative Government (1861) p42 
42
 As Fitzgerald himself said, ‘if the public is not informed, it cannot take part in the 
political process with any real effect’ (Report of a Commission of Inquiry into 
Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct) p126 
43
 As Peter Bayne says (‘Recurring Themes in the Interpretation of the 
Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act’ (1996) 24 Federal Law Review 287, 
290: ‘it should be recognised that our system is one of representative democracy, 
because ultimately the citizens of Australia are the source of all government power. 
This is turn suggests that the FOI Acts be interpreted in ways which will facilitate 
access by the citizenry to information held by government’. 
44
 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 231 
45
 Manly v Minister of Premier and Cabinet, unreported Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, 15/6/95. Speaking in a different context, Mason J in Commonwealth v 
John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 stated that ‘it is unacceptable in our 
democratic society that there should be a restraint on the publication of information 
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As the Queensland Information Commissioner stated in Re Eccleston
46
:  
 
Citizens in a representative democracy have the right to seek to 
participate in and influence the processes of government decision-
making and policy formulation on any issue of concern to them. The 
importance of FOI legislation is that it provides the means for a 
person to have access to the knowledge and information that will 
assist a more meaningful and effective exercise of that right.
47
 
 
The Commissioner noted that the enhancement of public participation in 
government was not an explicit purpose of the FOI law, but was implicit in 
some of its concepts. This point has also been made by other tribunals,
48
 
Government Ministers introducing FOI laws in some states,
49
 and 
academics.
50
 
                                                                                                                    
relating to government when the only vice of that information is that it enables the 
public to discuss, review and criticise government action’ (52). 
46
 Eccleston and Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs 
[1993] QICmr 2, para 71 
47
 The Information Commissioner referred to an article by David Feldman 
(‘Democracy, the Rule of Law and Judicial Review’ (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 
1, 2-4, where the author referred to a number of higher order rights implied by a 
democratic system of government, including the right of citizens to access the 
machinery of political decision-making). 
48
 In Re Cleary and Department of the Treasury (1993) 18 AAR 83, 87 the Tribunal 
stated that the FOI Act was predicated on a set of values which have at their core the 
promotion of democratic processes of government; refer also to the Western 
Australia Information Commissioner in Re Veale and Town of Bassendean, 
unreported Information Commissioner of Western Australia, 1994, Decision Ref 
D00494. 
49
 Former Deputy Premier of New South Wales, Wal Murray, in his second reading 
speech introducing the FOI bill into New South Wales Parliament spoke about the 
bill encompassing openness, accountability and responsibility. He said that some 
people felt powerless because they knew that many decisions affecting them were 
made by anonymous public officials, and based on information not available to the 
public. The FOI law was designed to remedy the situation (Legislative Assembly 
Debates NSW 2/6/1988 p1399). Former Queensland Attorney-General Dean Wells 
commenting in introducing the Queensland Act that it ‘enables people to have access 
to documents used by decision makers and will, in practical terms, produce a higher 
level of accountability and provide a greater opportunity for the public to participate 
in policy making and government itself’ (Parliamentary Debates, 5/12/91, p3849). 
The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission’s Report on Freedom of 
Information (December 1990 No90/86) found that ‘the fairness of decisions made by 
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Mason CJ in Australian Capital Television v Cth asserted that: 
 
The very concept of representative government and representative 
democracy signifies government by the people through their 
representatives … representatives who are members of Parliament 
and Ministers of State are not only chosen by the people but exercise 
their legislative and executive powers as representatives of the 
people. And in the exercise of those powers the representatives of 
necessity are accountable to the people for what they do and have a 
responsibility to take account of the views of the people on whose 
behalf they act … Indispensable to that accountability and that 
responsibility is freedom of communication, at least in relation to 
public affairs and political discussion. Only by exercising that 
freedom can the citizen communicate his or her views on the wide 
range of matters that may call for, or are relevant to, political action 
or decision. Only by exercising that freedom can the citizen criticise 
government decisions and actions, seek to bring about change, call 
for action where none has been taken and in this way influence the 
elected representatives … Absent such a freedom of communication, 
representative government would fail to achieve its purpose, namely 
government by the people, through their elected representatives; 
government would cease to be responsive to the needs and wishes of 
the people, and in that sense would cease to be truly representative
51
 
                                                                                                                    
government, and their accuracy, merit and acceptability, ultimately depend on the 
effective participation by those who will be affected by them’ (para 3.36). 
50
 Peter Bayne ‘Recurring Themes in the Interpretation of the Commonwealth 
Freedom of Information Act’ (1996) 24 Federal Law Review 287, 288: ‘The High 
Court decisions are not authority for a proposition that the right to political free 
speech embraces a right to obtain information from the government. There is, 
however, a relationship of affinity between that freedom and the FOI laws because 
the latter are also premises upon the values of democracy and representative 
government which underpin the constitutional right of free speech’; refer also to 
Peter Bayne ‘Freedom of Information and Democracy: A Return to the Basics?’ 
(1994) 1 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 107; and ‘Freedom of 
Information and Political Free Speech’ in T Campbell and W Sadurski eds Freedom 
of Communication (1994) p199. Finn refers to the public availability of information 
as an important value to be promoted within a democratic society: Official 
Information (Integrity in Government Project: Interim Report 1)(1991) p85. Refer 
also to Anne Cossins ‘Revisiting Open Government: Recent Developments in 
Shifting the Boundaries of Government Secrecy Under Public Interest Immunity and 
Freedom of Information Law’ (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 226 
51
 137-138 
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It is submitted the majority view is not compatible with this principle. 
 
 
 A Reasons for Non-Disclosure 
 
The author submits that the decision creates some difficulties with its 
approach to assessing the reasons for non-disclosure, as well as the reasons 
that were acceptable to a majority of the court in justifying non-disclosure. 
Certainly, this is not the first Act conferring a broad discretion on the 
Executive that is said to be exercised in an inappropriate way. Just as the 
courts have fought to impose restraints on the exercise of what might appear 
to be very broad ministerial discretions in other contexts, it is submitted that 
it is legitimate for the Court to do so here. In other contexts, the Court has 
held firm against attempts by the legislature to intrude on review of executive 
action.
52
 The principle of separation of powers requires no less and it is a 
fundamental aspect of our constitutional arrangements.  
 
There are comments by some current members of the High Court in similar 
contexts that the finding of the Minister should be (substantively) reviewable. 
Gummow J for example in Minister for Immigration v Eshetu
53
 referred with 
apparent approval to comments by Brennan J in Kruger v The 
Commonwealth
54
 that: 
 
When a discretionary power is statutorily conferred on a repository, 
the power must be exercised reasonably, for the legislature is taken to 
intend that the discretion be so exercised 
 
                                                 
52
 Refer for example to Chu Kheng Lim and Another v Minister for Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs and Another (1992) 176 CLR 1, and Plaintiff 
S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. Refer to Caron Beaton-Wells 
‘Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life After S157’ (2005) 33 Federal Law 
Review 141. The concerns raised in this article should not be taken to imply that the 
author believes the discretion here has been exercised more outrageously than 
discretions in other contexts. This is certainly not the case. It is reiterated that the 
review here was of a more limited nature than might occur in other contexts, 
involving the challenge to the reasonableness of the Minister’s view about public 
interest. 
53
 (1999) 197 CLR 611 
54
 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 36 
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The authority that fails to comply with this obligation acts unlawfully or ultra 
vires.
55
 This possibility was also canvassed by McHugh, Gummow and Kirby 
JJ in a recent judgment.
56
 
 
The author cannot agree with the reasoning in the joint judgment that if one 
reasonable ground for the claim of contrariety to the public interest exists, 
even though there may be reasonable grounds the other way, the 
conclusiveness will be beyond review. With respect, this interpretation is 
argued to be contrary to the spirit of freedom of information laws which 
create a general requirement of disclosure, subject to necessary exceptions. 
There would always be at least one reasonable ground upon to claim 
disclosure would be contrary to public interest. As the minority point out, 
confidentiality of governmental deliberations is always a reasonable 
consideration. One could add that the material might be the subject of a 
question in Parliament, or that disclosure of written documents might inhibit 
the documentation of advice which if purely verbal would not be obtainable, 
would also always be reasonable considerations. Yet if any of these reasons, 
or a combination of them, could be blandly asserted each time a Minister did 
not find it convenient for information to be disclosed, such that access could 
be denied to an interested person, the whole point of freedom of information 
legislation would be undermined. A court or tribunal’s power to review 
Ministerial action on the ground of reasonableness would be rendered 
virtually meaningless.
57
 The checks and balances on the Minister’s power 
would be insufficient. 
 
Surely, the public interest could be advanced as a reason either pointing 
towards or away from disclosure. Just as the Minister presumably weighed 
these factors up in making his/her decision under s36, surely so a reviewing 
tribunal must do in reviewing the decision made, not (in this context) to 
determine whether disclosure was in fact in the public interest or not ie not to 
revisit the decision, but to consider whether there were reasonable grounds 
for the claim that disclosure was not in the public interest. The author 
respectfully agrees with the position of Conti J in this respect. It is merely 
                                                 
55
 De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
56
 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Applicant 
S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, per McHugh and Gummow JJ (1179) and Kirby J 
(1188) 
57
 Of course, the Commonwealth Constitution posits a separation of powers: R v 
Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; Attorney-
General (Cth) v R; Ex Parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australian (1957) 95 CLR 529; 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)(1996) 189 CLR 51 
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considering one factor to consider whether a reasonable ground existed to 
support the Minister’s decision – that is not how the Minister would have 
made the decision; it is not how the decision should be reviewed. It is 
submitted that ‘reasonable grounds’ means that arguments in favour of and 
against disclosure have been considered. This is admittedly partly a policy 
decision – the alternative is that one reasonable ground is sufficient, and as 
has been noted, it will always be possible to find at least one reasonable 
ground. 
 
One might refer to cases decided on the common law principle of Crown 
immunity decided prior to the introduction of the FOI Act on the issue of 
reasonableness.
58
 While the author is aware of the different factual context in 
which Sankey arose, of course, it is permissible to examine the previous 
common law to assist in interpreting a statute where there is ambiguity, and 
the difference of opinion on the High Court in this case shows that there is 
ambiguity in how s36 must be applied. For example, in Sankey v Whitlam
59
 
members of the High Court referred to a decision about the public interest in 
the context of disclosure as a balancing exercise.
60
 Stephen J stated that it was 
‘the task of a court, in dealing with a claim to Crown privilege, to weigh 
competing public interests’.
61
 Mason J noted that:  
 
In considering an objection to production on the ground of Crown 
privilege the court must evaluate the respective public interests and 
determine whether on balance the public interest which calls for non-
disclosure outweighs the public interest in (favour of disclosure) … 
In determining this question the court, though it will give weight to 
the Minister’s opinion that the documents should not be produced, is 
                                                 
58
 This is the limited extent to which Sankey is submitted to be useful – the author 
concedes that case involved a criminal prosecution.  
59
 (1978) 142 CLR 1. I acknowledge this was not an FOI case but believe it is 
relevant to the present discussion, dealing with relevant common law principles. 
60
 Citing with approval the House of Lords decisions in Conway v Rimmer [1968] 
AC 910 (especially Lord Reid (990-995), Lord Morris (956-957,972), Lord Pearce 
(986-987) and Lord Upjohn (992); Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388, and the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v Nixon (1974) 418 US 
683. Lord Pearson was adamant in Rogers that in applying the doctrine of public 
interest, ‘the court has to balance the detriment to the public interest on the 
administrative or executive side, which would result from the disclosure of the 
document or information, against the detriment to the public interest on the judicial 
side, which would result from the non-disclosure of a document or information’ 
(406) 
61
 P58 
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entitled to inspect the documents and form its own conclusion upon 
the question whether the public interest will be better served by 
production or non-production
62
 
 
Adapting Mason J’s words to the slightly different legislative formulation 
here which specifies a limited range of judicial review rather than a full 
merits review of the Minister’s opinion, it is submitted that the court must 
conduct a balancing exercise in order to determine whether the Minister’s 
opinion is a reasonable one (again, not reviewing the merits of the decision, 
but asking whether it is a reasonable one). In assessing whether or not the 
opinion is reasonable, the court must form its own conclusion, rather than 
rely on a bland assertion of inter-governmental confidentiality that, if 
accepted as a general justification, could effectively kill off freedom of 
information principles altogether. It is submitted that this does involve a 
weighing process, as the common law process acknowledged. 
 
Again in the different context of industrial legislation, the High Court (Mason 
CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ) in Re Queensland Electricity Commission; ex 
parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia (QEC) stated that: 
 
Ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lies 
will often depend on a balancing of interests, including competing 
public interests, and be very much a question of fact and degree.
63
 
 
Conti J in the McKinnon litigation, conceding that as with the Sankey 
comments they arose in a different context from the current, nevertheless 
referred to the QEC case to support his view of how the Tribunal should have 
conducted its review exercise.
64
 He believed the comments about public 
interest more generally remained apposite to the current litigation. 
 
One of the grounds cited for non-disclosure was that release might jeopardise 
candour of discussions within government. Of the majority, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ seemed to accept this argument, concluding it ‘could not readily 
be dismissed’,
65
 and that the Minister’s opinion on this was likely to be ‘as 
well informed and valuable as those of anyone else’. The judgment on this 
ground is contained in one paragraph of their Honours’ judgment, and no 
                                                 
62
 P96 
63
 (1987) 61 ALJR 393, 395; Deane J to like effect on this point (400) 
64
 90 
65
 1575 
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cases are referred to by their Honours in accepting this justification for non-
disclosure. 
Some other judges have considered and rejected such arguments as legitimate 
grounds for non-disclosure, albeit in a non-FOI context.
66
 Mason J in Sankey 
v Whitlam
67
 (a decision to which the majority judgments of the High Court in 
the current case did not refer) emphatically concluded that the ‘possibility 
that premature disclosure will result in want of candour in cabinet discussions 
or in advice given by public servants is so slight that it may be ignored’.
68
 
Lord Reid in Conway v Rimmer,
69
 while accepting that Cabinet minutes 
should generally not be released,
70
 added in obiter ‘but I do not think that 
many people would give as the reason that premature disclosure would 
prevent candour in the Cabinet’.
71
 These comments are also submitted to be 
                                                 
66
 These cases were decided on common law principles rather than FOI-specific 
principles but they are submitted as relevant, dealing with the same issue of non-
disclosure of documents on claimed public interest grounds. 
67
 (1978) 142 CLR 1,97 
68
 Mason J did then concede that the efficiency of government would be seriously 
compromised if Cabinet decisions and papers were disclosed while they or the topics 
to which they relate are still current or controversial (97). If the topic was no longer 
current, the risk of injury to the efficient working of government became slighter, so 
disclosure would be feasible (98). 
69
 [1968] AC 910, 952 
70
 ‘Virtually everyone agrees that Cabinet minutes … ought not to be disclosed until 
such time as they are of historical interest … the most important reason is that such 
disclosure would create or fan ill-formed or captious public or political criticism … 
the business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could 
contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being 
exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the 
background and perhaps with some axe to grind’ (99). Mason J in Sankey v Whitlam, 
while agreeing generally with these remarks, did not think that the possibility of ill-
informed criticism and its inconveniences was the reason, preferring the justification 
that decision making would be difficult if the decision making processes of Cabinet 
and the materials on which they were based were at risk of premature publication 
(97). Lord Reid’s comments have not escaped criticism: see for example Eagles 
‘Cabinet Secrets as Evidence’ (1980) Public Law 263, 269 who claims it is unlikely 
that hard decisions will be avoided or that Cabinet will be swayed by pressure groups 
any more than currently is the case, if disclosure rights were broader. The 
Queensland Information Commissioner does not think Lord Reid’s comments reflect 
the position in Australia given Mason J’s views in Fairfax and ACT v Commonwealth 
(No2): Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander 
Affairs (1994) 1 QAR 60, 100-101 
71
 Similar comments appear in the judgment of Lord Radcliffe in the Glasgow 
Corporation Case (1956) S C (HL) p20 who thought that he would have supposed 
Crown servants to be made of ‘sterner stuff’ (than to be worried about disclosure 
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analogous to candour within a government department. They are made in a 
different context, but this does not affect the sentiment. 
 
Another ground cited in favour of non-disclosure was that the material was 
tentative, including matters that were not settled and recommendations that 
were not adopted. Callinan and Heydon JJ accepted that the Minister’s 
decision that ‘material of that kind would not make a valuable contribution to 
public debate’ was a reasonable one.
72
 With respect, the spirit of the freedom 
of information laws is surely that it is not up to the Minister to decide finally 
what information should be released and what information should not be 
released. If this were the case, there would be no need for FOI legislation. 
The right of access FOI legislation grants is for an obvious reason – if it were 
the government’s decision, the government might be inclined to release only 
information deemed favourable to them, or deemed unlikely to cause concern 
to voters. As Mason J pointed out in Commonwealth of Australia v John 
Fairfax and Sons Ltd:
73
  
 
It is unacceptable in our democratic society that there should be a 
restraint on the publication of information relating to government 
when the only vice of that information is that it enables the public to 
discuss, review and criticise government action. 
 
If a Court were to blindly accept at face value the assertion of a Minister that 
release of information would not make a valuable contribution to public 
debate, the Government may well be tempted to block the release of 
information that would entitle the public to ‘discuss, review and criticise 
government action’. Of course, it may not be convenient for a government for 
the public to be involved in a critical debate of a government policy or 
decision. For this reason, the author submits that the court should not merely 
accept at face value an assertion by a member of the Executive that release of 
the information would not valuably contribute to public debate. With respect, 
the Information Commissioner, Tribunal or Court as interpreters of the FOI 
                                                                                                                    
such that candour would be inhibited), and Lord Salmon in Rogers v Home Secretary 
[1973] AC 413 referred to the candour argument as the ‘old fallacy’. The position 
was summarised in Re Wallace and Merit Protection and Review Agency (1995) 38 
ALD 773, 775-776 that ‘the trend of the cases is in favour of giving weight to the 
objects of the FOI Act over submissions arguing a lack of candour would result if 
disclosure is ordered’. Candour is one of the factors mentioned in the now-
discredited Re Howard and The Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia (1985) 
3 AAR 169,176. 
72
 1575 
73
 (1980) 147 CLR 39,52 
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legislation are the arbiters of what information is accessible or not under the 
legislation; not the government.
74
 The principle of separation of powers 
requires the amenability of Ministerial decision making to review,
75
 which 
should not be watered down.
76
  In the context of the specific wording of s36, 
the Minister should be required to demonstrate the specific reasonableness of 
this view that this information would not be valuable as part of a contribution 
to public debate. Mere assertion is not satisfactory to this writer.
77
 
 
 
 B Other Criticisms 
 
A further suggested interpretation difficulty with the decision is how the 
court dealt with evidence relating to the object of the FOI law. Section 15AA 
of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) makes clear, and s3(2) of the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) reinforces, that Commonwealth 
legislation must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the objects for 
which the law was passed. In this light, it is curious that the interpretation 
used by Callinan and Heydon JJ is, as they expressly acknowledge, ‘may’ 
practically lead to the consequence that one or more of the stated objects of 
the Act is thereby defeated. Their Honours claim this consequence is caused 
                                                 
74
 Acting Chief Justice Gibbs made the same point in relation to the common law in 
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1,38: ‘It is in all cases the duty of the court, and 
not the privilege of the executive government, to decide whether a document will be 
produced or may be withheld’. 
75
 Some might argue it is the decision of the Tribunal, rather than the decision of the 
Minister, that is under challenge. This might be technically correct, but since the 
decision of the Tribunal is about the decision of the Minister, it is submitted that 
indirectly or defacto the court’s review here concerns the decision of the Minister. 
76
 There is a significant literature in Australia on the principle of separation of 
powers. Refer for example to George Winterton ‘The Separation of Judicial Power as 
an Implied Bill of Rights’ in Geoffrey Lindell ed Future Directions in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1994); Elizabeth Wheeler ‘Original Intent and the Doctrine of 
the Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 96; Finnis 
‘Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution’ (1967) 3 Adelaide Law Review 
159; Elizabeth Handsley ‘Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red Herring for the 
Separation of Judicial Power’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 183; Fiona Wheeler 
‘The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power Under Chapter III of the Constitution: A 
Decade in Overview’ (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 283; and Anthony Gray 
‘Alert and Alarmed: The National Security Information Act’ (2006) 24(1) University 
of Tasmania Law Review 1. 
77
 Again, this is not to suggest that the Court is substituting its decision for that of the 
original decision maker. 
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by the ‘unmistakable’ language of the FOI Act.
78
 One might respectfully 
quibble with their classification of the language as ‘unmistakable’. The 
concept of public interest is inherently not suitable for precise definition,
79
 as 
the Australian Senate Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
considering the draft Commonwealth FOI laws noted.
80
 That Committee 
expressly declined to define public interest for that reason.  
 
Given that the concept of public interest is flexible, should a court not if 
possible (and should a Minister not if possible) interpret the test of public 
interest in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Act in which the test 
appears? It would be one thing if this were not possible; however clearly it 
was possible in the Act in question here, as the minority did. It is surely a 
basic principle of statutory interpretation that, where possible, sections of an 
Act should be interpreted consistently with the stated objects of the Act. That 
is indeed a primary reason for including express objects in the first place. 
 
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
It is submitted that the majority judgment in McKinnon gives an unduly 
narrow scope to the federal Freedom of Information Act in, indirectly, 
allowing Ministers to avoid compliance with the Act by merely issuing a 
certificate that the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the public 
interest.
81
 Although the Act does not provide for a full merits review of this 
decision, it is suggested that the High Court needs to more rigorously review 
the assessment of the Executive in this regard, to ensure that the objects of 
FOI law are met. The Constitution and its principles of representative 
government and separation of powers requires no less. 
 
It has been argued that, consistently with the Constitution, the doctrine of 
representative government, as well as the inherent sovereignty of the people, 
the High Court should take a broader view of freedom of information rights. 
                                                 
78
 This is presumably a reference to s36 of the Act, containing the relevant 
exemption. 
79
 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex Parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 
CLR 361 
80
 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs Report on the 
Freedom of Information Bill 1978 and Aspects of the Archives Act 1978, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1979 p66; to like effect Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and 
Legal Affairs Report on the Operation and Administration of the Freedom of 
Information Legislation, AGPS, Canberra, 1987 p155 
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Citizens cannot make informed decisions as to who is best to represent them 
if they can be easily prevented from obtaining detailed information about 
government decision making. The decision is hard to reconcile with previous 
decisions, albeit in a non-FOI context. Further, a reading of the FOI Act as a 
whole would tend to favour a broad construction of access rights, rather than 
allowing a government to suppress documents thought to be politically 
sensitive. 
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